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Abstract
In the past decades, elimination of the pay-as-you-go system in U.S. has been extensively discussed
and studied. Such an elimination would also eliminate the intragenerational redistribution done
by the following policies of social security. Due to spousal and survivor’s benefit provisions, Social
Security system redistributes (mostly) to single-earner married households (not necessarily pro-
gressive). Retirement benefits are a concave function of past mean earnings. Hence, the system
redistributes from high earners to low earners. Finally, existence of a cap on social security tax-
able earnings makes the system regressive. This is the first paper that quantifies redistributive,
labor supply, and welfare implications of these policies using a general equilibrium life-cycle model.
Agents start out as permanently married or single and with education levels and wage profiles,
where the latter depend both on education and gender. The household is the decision maker and
decides on labor supply of its member(s) and saving. The aggregate production function has as
inputs capital and labor aggregated by efficiency. Elimination of these policies results in a 5.5%
rise in labor force participation of married females, while increasing aggregate welfare by 0.4%.
A majority of households experience positive gains in welfare. Single-earner married households
incur large welfare losses (as big as 1.1%), whereas two-earner households with high skilled spouses
experience substantial welfare gains (as big as 1.9%).
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1 Introduction
Due to aging of US population, reforming its social security system has been a hot topic for
policy makers as well as academic economists in the past decades.1 Many reform proposals,
including elimination of the current pay-as-you-go system, have been widely discussed and
studied. Most of the discussions overlook the fact that elimination of the current system will
also eliminate the intragenerational redistribution that is built into the system. Implications
of eliminating major redistributive policies of social security on labor supply and welfare
has been unexplored in the dynamic equilibrium analyses in the macroeconomics and public
finance literatures. This paper fills this gap.
Current workers face a flat payroll tax rate up to a cap level of earnings.2 Monthly
benefit entitlement of a retiree, i.e, Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), is a function of average
past earnings. The overall system is generally thought to be progressive since this function
replaces a larger fraction of past earnings for lower earners than higher earners. However,
spousal and survivor’s benefit provisions may break this relation between one’s past earnings
and retirement income.
Existing system gives a married retiree the right to collect the higher of own PIA and
the spousal benefit, a provision that is equal to fifty percent of the spouse’s PIA. Hence,
the system pays retirement income to some individuals who never pay payroll taxes. For
instance, a lifelong single-earner married household collects one hundred fifty percent of the
PIA of the breadwinner every month upon retirement.3 In addition, a survivor gets the
higher of own PIA and the survivor’s benefit, a provision that amounts to one hundred
percent of the spouse’s PIA. Even though these provisions aid many married households,
they potentially discourage labor force participation of secondary earners at young ages by
increasing value of non-participation. Moreover, with these provisions, the system leads to
1 U.S. Social Security System is facing a serious financial imbalance over the next 75 years. Projected
OASDI tax collections will only be sufficient to finance about 75% of scheduled annual benefit payments in
2037 through 2084 (Board of Trustees Report 2010).
2 In 2014, the social security tax rate is 12.4% and the earnings cap is $117,000.
3 Indeed, when the spousal benefit provision was added to social security law in 1939, one of the explicit
aims was to encourage traditional bread winner-home maker households. See Carlson (2005) for development
of 1939 amendments to social security system.
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an important intragenerational redistribution. The system potentially redistributes to many
single-earner married households and to the two-earner households who qualify to get these
provisions. Additionally, even though a greater fraction of low earner married households
take advantage of spousal and survivor’s benefits, these provisions do not necessarily play a
progressive role. Since the spousal and survivor’s benefits increase with past mean earnings
of the primary earner in the household, these rules are regressive among the recipients of
these benefits.
The earnings cap is another redistributive policy of the social security. Workers do not
pay social security taxes for their earnings in excess of the earnings cap, hence, high earners
face a lower marginal tax rate than the others. This policy makes the social security more
regressive.
This paper contributes to the literature by addressing the following quantitative ques-
tions. What are the macroeconomic and welfare consequences of eliminating these policies,
while keeping the pay-as-you go system intact? How much labor supply of different house-
holds, in particular, labor supply of married females, respond to this policy reform? Who
gains, who loses, and by how much? What kind of an intragenerational redistribution is
eliminated? Would a majority of households support such a policy reform?
With these questions in mind, I build and calibrate a general equilibrium overlapping
generations model with capital and heterogenous agents. Agents start out as married or
single, and their marital status do not change over the life-cycle. After retirement, each
agent faces a gender and age dependent mortality risk. Agents have certain education
levels and wage profiles, where the latter depend on agents’ education and gender. The
household is the decision maker and decides on labor supply of its member(s) and saving.
The labor supply decision of a married household is a joint decision and involves a labor
market participation decision for the female. The households with two earners incur an
additional fixed utility cost, where the costs differ across households. Besides income and
capital taxes, workers pay social security taxes. As in the current system, PIA of a retiree is
determined by a piecewise-linear concave function. Qualifying married households receive
the spousal benefit provision, whereas qualifying survivors receive the survival benefit pro-
vision. The calibrated model economy closely resembles features of the 2000 U.S. economy.
The benchmark economy is consistent with observations on gender wage gap, wage premia
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and married female labor force participation across education groups, and the structure of
marital sorting. The structure of taxation closely resembles the income taxes paid in 2000.
Eliminating the spousal and survivor’s benefits, the progressive calculation of benefits,
and the earnings cap all at once raises output by 1.2%, while raising capital by 2.1%, and,
labor by 0.7%. Only source of the rise in labor is a 5.5% rise in the labor force participation
of married females. Labor supply of workers along intensive margin decreases at a negligible
amount. At the same time, aggregate welfare increases by about 0.4%, while a majority of
households experience positive welfare gains.
There are substantial changes in labor force participation rate of married females. The
changes range between 2%-10.7%. A larger fraction of relatively low skilled married females
respond to the policy reform by starting to participate in the labor market.4
A substantial amount of redistribution from married households with high skilled spouses
to married households with low skilled spouses is eliminated. On average, retirement benefits
of married households composed of spouses with less than high school degree decrease by
22.4%, whereas retirement benefits of married households composed of spouses with more
than college education increase by 23.2%.
Even though the married households with lowest skilled spouses experience the biggest
decline in retirement income, they are not the biggest losers of this policy reform. Married
households composed of relatively low skilled females and high skilled males, who are mostly
single-earners, incur larger welfare losses (as much as 1.1%). On the other hand the ones
with relatively high skilled females, who are mostly two-earners, experience substantial wel-
fare gains (as much as 1.9%). Among single individuals, welfare of relatively high skilled
individuals increase (as much as 2.7%), while welfare of very low skilled females decrease
(1.2%).
To see where these overall effects are coming form, I evaluate the consequences of elimi-
nating each of the redistributive policies one by one.
The substantial rise in female labor force participation is due to the elimination of the
spousal and survivor’s benefits. This provision discourages many married females from work
at young ages by increasing value of non-participation.
4 As discussed below, skill type of an individual is assumed to be captured by his/her education.
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The gains in aggregate welfare are largely due to the elimination of the spousal and
survivor’s benefits. Elimination of the progressive calculation contributes negatively to
the aggregate welfare, while elimination of the earnings cap slightly increases the aggregate
welfare.
Elimination of the spousal and survivor’s benefits is the reason why single-earner married
households, the ones with high skilled males and low skilled females, experience the larger
losses in welfare. Married households with two-earners, the ones with high skilled members,
experience large welfare gains because of the elimination of both the progressive calculation
of benefits and the spousal and survivor’s benefits. Elimination of the latter policy benefits
these households due to a general equilibrium effect on retirement benefits. On the other
hand, elimination of the cap on earnings increases taxes of high earning individuals. As a
result, eliminating this policy has a small negative effect on welfare of married households
with highest type males.
Related Literature –Liebman (2002) is the first paper that attempts to measure the
intragenerational redistribution due to the rules of social security. It is a microsimulation
exercise that is able to capture all of the heterogeneity available in the data. However, this
study fails to account for the behavioral and general equilibrium implications of counter-
factual changes in social security rules. Moreover, it is silent about welfare effects of such
changes. As I discuss below, eliminating these rules have significant implications on saving
and labor supply decisions of households as well as their welfare.
Nishiyama (2010) studies implications of eliminating spousal and survivor’s benefit pro-
visions using a general equilibrium model with uninsurable wage shocks. Main differences
between this paper and Nishiyama (2010) are: i) it does not model female labor force par-
ticipation explicitly, ii) it does not study implications of progressivity of benefit calculations
and earnings cap and hence does not evaluate all redistributive aspects of social security,
iii) it only considers married households and therefore overestimates the general equilibrium
consequences of eliminating the provisions. Blau (1997) also investigates the effects of the
spousal benefit provision on labor force participation of married women.5 In order to over-
come estimation problems, he assumes away households’ saving decisions and labor supply
5 See also Gustman and Steinmeier (2004), Blau (1998), and Blau(1998).
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decisions along hours margin, the progressive calculation of benefits and general equilibrium
implications of eliminating the provision.
Distributional consequences of reforming US Social Security has been previously studied
by Huggett and Ventura (1999), Conesa and Kruger (1999). None of these papers focus on
distributional aspects of social security that affect mainly two-earner households. They fo-
cus on heterogenous single-earner agents, hence, can not capture consequences of eliminating
spousal and survivor’ benefits. However, this paper shows that eliminating these provisions
imply a substantial intragenerational redistribution together with substantial effects on fe-
male labor supply and welfare.
Finally, the model economy detailed below has many common elements with Kaygusuz
(2010), Guner, Kaygusuz, Ventura (2012a), and Guner, Kaygusuz, Ventura (2012b). Addi-
tionally, current paper has a better representation of US Social Security, which is critical for
the questions posed by this paper.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details specifics of the model. Section
3 describes the parameterization of the benchmark economy. Section 4 has a detailed
description of the reforms that I study together with the findings. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Life-Cycle Model with Two-Earner Households
In this section I lay out the details of a stationary general equilibrium life-cycle model
populated with single and married households.6
Demographics
The economy is populated by overlapping generations that consists of a continuum of
males and a continuum of females. Every period a new generation of individuals is born.
The population growth rate is given with n. Agents in this economy live at most J periods.
They begin life as workers and retire after the mandatory retirement age jR.
7 Starting
with the last period of working life, an agent faces a positive mortality risk at the end of each
6 The model economy has many common elements with Guner, Kaygusuz, Ventura (2012a), Guner,
Kaygusuz, Ventura (2012b). However, current paper has a a very detailed modelling of social security in
contrast to these other papers.
7 Retirement in this paper is the age at which the agents start collecting retirement income. Agents can
always choose not to work at, or before age jR.
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period. In particular a person with gender i, with i ∈ {m, f}, faces a survival probability of
ρij from age j to age j+1. Each agent enters economic life as married or single. I assume
that a constant fraction φ of the newborns are married and the rest are single. There is no
divorce or marriage over the life-cycle.8 Note that, since the survival risk is at individual
level, spouses can possibly die at different ages. Moreover, due to the assumption on the
values of the survival probability (ρij = 1 for j < jR), a survivor also is a retiree.
Productive Heterogeneity
Workers differ by their market productivity levels. The productivity of a worker, ei(z, j),
depends on the agent’s intrinsic skill type z, age j, and gender i. Skill type z comes from
a finite set Z = {z1, z2, ...}. I assume that each agent is born with a particular skill type
that does not change over the life-cycle. Moreover, there is no uncertainty about a worker’s
future productivity.
When z is the skill type of the wife and z˜ is the skill type of the husband, M(z, z˜)
denotes the distribution married households by skill types of the spouses. Similarly, Si(z)
denotes the distribution of gender-i single households by skill type. Finally, let Ω(z) and
Ψ(z) denote the distributions of males and females by their types, respectively.9
Preferences
In this economy agents value consumption and dislike labor. The utility function for a
single person is given with
US (c, l) = ln(c)− θ l
1+ 1
γ
1 + 1
γ
, (1)
where c is consumption, l is labor, γ is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and θ > 0 is
taste parameter for labor. On the other hand, a married household’s utility function is
UM(c, lm, lf , q) = 2 ln(c)− θ l
1+ 1
γ
m
1 + 1
γ
− θ l
1+ 1
γ
f
1 + 1
γ
− χ(lf )q. (2)
c is consumption, and li, i ∈ {m, f}, is labor supply. q stands for per period utility cost
of joint-work. χ(lf ) is an indicator function that takes a value of 1 if the female supplies
8 Allowing for divorce and remarriage in the model would require an extra state variable: the distribution
of singles at a given age by all sorts of characteristics. Given the heterogeneity considered in this paper,
such an exercise is computationally challenging.
9 As can be seen from the choice of the notation, I assume that these skill distributions are age invariant.
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a positive amount of labor. I assume that husbands who are not retired always work, but
wives may choose to stay out of the labor force. Following Cho and Rogerson (1988), I
assume that if a wife participates in the labor market then her household incurs a utility
cost of q ∈ R+.10 The household draws its utility cost at age 1 from a distribution Φ() that
depends on the skill of the husband. Finally, I assume that q is constant over the life-cycle.
Income
Labor earnings, capital income, and retirement benefits are the sources of income. The
agents participate in a competitive labor market where w is the wage rate per efficiency unit
of labor. Households can save in the form of a risk-free asset and earn a competitive rental
rate r. Moreover, I assume that they are born with no assets and are not allowed to borrow.
Asset holdings of a deceased household are not rebated back to the agents who are alive
(i.e., no bequests). I focus on a steady state equilibrium at which w and r are constant over
time.
A j-year old married household (j ≤ jR) earns ef (z, j)lfw + em(z˜, j)lmw if the spouses
work lf and lm hours in the market. Moreover, if the household’s asset holdings is a units,
then the total household income is ef (z, j)lfw +em(z˜, j)lmw + ra. Similarly, income of a
j-year old single agent is the sum of labor earnings, ei(z, j)liw, and interest income, ra.
Income of a retired household is the sum of retirement benefit payments and interest
income. Below, I describe the social security system in more detail.
Social Security
There is a pay-as-you-go social security system that taxes labor earnings and uses all of
the proceeds to pay for the retirement benefits.
Taxable earnings for social security purposes consists only of labor earnings up to Emax >
0. For earnings below this cap, a worker faces a proportional social security tax rate τ p.
The social security tax payment of a worker is given with
T p(ei(z, j)liw) = τ
pmin{ei(z, j)liw,Emax}. (3)
Henceforth, I will refer to min{ei(z, j)liw,Emax} as social security taxable earnings of an
agent.
10 The utility cost can be interpreted as utility loss due to inconvenience for scheduling and/or less family
time with children.
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The benefit that an agent is entitled to, B(e¯i), depends on the average of her/his past
social security taxable labor earnings, e¯i.
B(e¯i) =

ξ1e¯i
ξ1κ1 + ξ2(e¯i − κ1)
ξ1κ1 + ξ2(κ2 − κ1) + ξ3(e¯i − κ2)
if e¯i ≤ κ1
if κ2 ≥ e¯i ≥ κ1
if e¯i ≥ κ2
(4)
ξ1, ξ2 and ξ3 are all between 0 and 1. This particular functional form is the one that is
used by the the current social security system.11 The past mean earnings of a retiree is
calculated as follows.
e¯i =
jR∑
j=1
min{ei(z, j)liw,Emax}/jR (5)
A single household collects her/his entitlement as the social security benefit payment.
On the other hand, a married household is treated differently. In principle the household
can receive a retirement benefit that is different than the sum of the entitlements of the
spouses. The system gives a married person the right to collect the higher of own benefit
entitlement and half of the spouse’s entitlement. If the person collects the latter she/he is
said to collect the spousal benefit. The total benefit payments that the married household
receives is given as
H(e¯f , e¯m) = max{B(e¯m) +B(e¯f ), B(e¯m) + 1
2
B(e¯m), B(e¯f ) +
1
2
B(e¯f )}. (6)
A survivor also can collect a retirement benefit that is different than his/her entitlement.
The system gives a survivor the right to collect the higher of his/her entitlement and the
full amount of the deceased spouse’s entitlement. If the agent collects the latter she/he is
said to collect the survivor’s benefit. The total benefit collection of the survivor can be
summarized as
D(e¯f , e¯m) = max{B(e¯m), B(e¯f )}. (7)
Income Taxation
Households pay income tax and capital income tax. Income tax that a household pays
depends on the household’s taxable income and marital status. The taxable income is sum
11 See http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2000/apnd.pdf for details.
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of the labor earnings and the capital income. For simplicity, I assume that benefit payments
are exempt from income taxation. Income tax functions for married and single households
are denoted by TM(.) and T S(.), respectively.
In this economy capital income is subject to double taxation.12 Besides income taxes,
households pay an additional tax for their capital incomes at a proportional rate τ k.
Technology
There is a single representative firm in the economy which hires capital and labor. Let
K denote the aggregate capital and L denote the aggregate labor in efficiency units. The
production technology of the firm is
Y = KαL1−α, (8)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is the output share of capital. The capital depreciates at a constant rate
δ ∈ (0, 1).
Decision Making
In this economy younger households make asset holdings and labor supply decisions,
whereas retirees only choose the asset holdings. A married household with age less than jR
chooses the labor supply of the wife both at the intensive and extensive margins. Next, I
describe in detail the problems faced by different households in the economy
Single Workers
Consider the problem of a j-year old, gender-i, single worker (j ≤ jR). The agent has
a skill type z and a units of the asset at the beginning of the current period. Finally, the
household observes his/her past mean earnings, e¯, before making any decisions.13 The
household chooses consumption, c, labor supply, l, and future asset holdings, a′, by solving
the following problem.
V Sij (z, a, e¯) = max
a′≥0, l∈[0,1]
US(c, l) + βρijV
S
ij+1(z, a
′, e¯′) (9)
subject to
c+ a′ = ei(z, j)wl + (1 + r)a− T p(ei(z, j)wl)− T S(ei(z, j)wl + ra)− τ kra
12 Additional capital income taxation exists in order to capture the corporate income taxes paid.
13 One should note that a new born begins life with zero asset holdings and zero past mean earnings.
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e¯′ =
(j − 1)e¯+min{ei(z, j)lw, Emax}
j
,
where β > 0 is the discount factor. Recall that the survival probability, ρij, takes values
less than 1 for j ≥ jR. Finally, the last equation describes the law of motion for past mean
social security taxable earnings.
Single Retirees
The problem of a single retired household (j > jR) with the same characteristics is given
as
V Sij (z, a, e¯) = max
a′≥0
US(c, 0) + βρijV
S
ij+1(z, a
′, e¯),
subject to
c+ a′ = (1 + r)a+B(e¯)− T S(ra)− τ kra.
As can be seen from the statement of the problem, e¯ for a retiree does not change. It only
changes for workers.
Worker Married Households
Now, consider the problem of a j-year old married household with j ≤ jR. The wife has
a skill type z, and the husband has a skill type z˜. The household holds a units of the asset.
Recall that q denotes the utility cost of joint work for the household. Before taking any
decisions on current consumption (c), labor supply of the husband (lm), labor supply of the
wife (lf ), and future asset holdings (a
′), the household observes the past mean earnings of
the husband and the wife (e¯m and e¯f ). The problem of the household can be written as
V Mj (z, z˜, q, a, e¯m, e¯f ) = max
a′≥0, lf ,lm∈[0,1]
UM(c, lm, lf , q) + β[ρmjρfjV
M
j+1(z, z˜, q, a
′, e¯′m, e¯
′
f )
+ ρmj(1− ρfj)SV Rmj+1(z˜, q, a′, e¯′m, e¯′f )
+ ρfj(1− ρmj)SV Rfj+1(z, q, a′, e¯′m, e¯′f )]
subject to
c+ a′ = em(z˜, j)wlm + ef (z, j)wlf + (1 + r)a− T p(em(z˜, j)wlm)
− T p(ef (z, j)wlf )− TM(em(z˜, j)wlm + ef (z, j)wlf + ra)− τ kra,
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e¯′i =
(j − 1)e¯i +min{ei(z, j)lw,Emax}
j
, i ∈ {m, f}.
SV Rij() denotes the value function for a j−year old survivor of gender i. The husband
becomes a survivor with probability ρmj(1− ρfj), whereas the wife becomes one with prob-
ability ρfj(1 − ρmj). The last equation describes the law of motion for past mean social
security taxable earnings of each spouse.
Retired Married Households
Next, consider the problem of a j-year old retired couple. Only choice variable for the
household is the asset holdings for future.
V Mj (z, z˜, q, a, e¯m, e¯f ) = max
a′≥0
UM(c, 0, 0, q) + β[ρmjρfjV
M
j+1(z, z˜, q, a
′, e¯m, e¯f )
+ ρmj(1− ρfj)SV Rmj+1(z˜, q, a′, e¯m, e¯f )
+ ρfj(1− ρmj)SV Rfj+1(z, q, a′, e¯m, e¯f )]
subject to
c+ a′ = (1 + r)a− τ kra+H(e¯f , e¯m)− TM(ra),
where H() is the benefit payment that the household receives (equation 6).
Finally consider the problem of a j-year old survivor with a units of asset holdings.
SV Rij(z, q, a, e¯m, e¯f ) = max
a′≥0
US(c, 0) + βρijSV Rij(z, q, a
′, e¯m, e¯f )
subject to
c+ a′ = (1 + r)a+D(e¯f , e¯m)− τ kra− TM(ra)
where D(e¯f , e¯m) is the retirement benefit of the survivor.
Discussion
Given the model economy described above, it can be argued that availability of the
spousal and survivor’s benefits provision discourages labor force participation for most mar-
ried women. Its presence increases the value of non-participation in labor force. Hence,
an elimination of this policy is likely to increase participation rate of females. The ben-
eficiaries of this policy are life-long single-earner married households and some qualifying
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two-earner households.14 The households who can not enjoy this policy are most life-long
two-earner households with relatively high earning females, and all single households. Hence,
this policy mainly redistributes from relatively high earning two-earner households and single
households to (mostly) life-long single-earner households. Thinking that most single-earner
married households are relatively low earners, this policy might seem as a progressive tool.
However, it is not necessarily as such. Among the recipients of the spousal and survivor’s
benefits, the benefit collections increase with average earnings of primary earners. There-
fore, an elimination of this policy is likely to hurt most single-earner married households
with relatively high earning husbands and relatively low earning wives.
The progressive calculation of social security benefits is a tool that redistributes from
high earning households to low earning households. An elimination of this policy alone,
will increase the retirement income of high earning individuals and decrease the retirement
income of low earning individuals. As a response to such a change, a low earner individual is
likely to increase his/her labor supply and savings, whereas a high earner individual is likely
to decrease his/her labor supply and savings. Such a change is likely to hurt a low earner,
and benefit a high earner.
On the other hand, the cap on social security taxable earnings works as a regressive
tool. Earnings above the cap are not taxed for social security purposes. While keeping
other policies intact, an elimination of this policy is likely to hurt relatively high earning
individuals, since they will start facing higher marginal tax rates for their earnings. On the
other hand, such a change will benefit others through general equilibrium effects.
The spousal and survivor’s benefits, progressive calculation of benefits, and earnings cap
have different implications on behavior of different households and result in non-trivial redis-
tributions. Using the parameterized model, below I investigate the quantitative implications
of these policies.
14 A two-earner household collects the spousal and survivor’s benefits if the retirement benefit of the wife
is less than fifty percent of the husband’s benefit, or the wife is a survivor and her benefit is less than the
husband’s benefit.
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3 Parameter Values
In this section I summarize the calibration strategy and discuss parameter values that I use
to simulate the model economies. Tables 1-4 report the values of these parameters.
Demographics
The model economy is calibrated to the U.S. economy in 2000. U.S. Census data are
used unless stated otherwise.15 Length of a period is set to be 10 years. Age 1 in the model
corresponds to ages between 25 and 34. Agents live at most 7 periods (J = 7) and retire
after age 4 (jR = 4). Since all agents die at the end of final period, the probability of survival
to the 8th period is set as 0 (ρi7 = 0). Recall that agents in the model face mortality risk
only at or after age jR. Hence, ρij is 1 for all j < jR for i ∈ {m, f}. The remaining survival
probabilities are constructed using data from Social Security Administration’s publication
(see Table 4). The population rate, n = 0.105, is consistent with the long-run average of
U.S. population growth rate (corresponds to an annual growth rate of 1%). As a result,
the fraction of retirees in the model economy at any given date is about 18.9%, whereas it
is 19.2% in the data.16 Since 74 percent of people between ages 25 and 64 are married in
the data, φ is chosen to be 0.74.
Skills and Endowments
I assume that a skill type is represented by education in the data. Moreover, I assume
five skill types corresponding to the educational attainment levels of less than high school
education (<hs), high school degree (hs), some college education (sc), college degree (col),
and more than college education (col+).
In order to construct the distributions of households by education, I consider the sample
between ages 25 and 64. First, I find the distribution of married households by education of
the spouses (as shown in Table 1). One can observe the well known fact about assortative
mating from this table. Spouses in most married households have similar educational
15 Source: Census data tabulated by IPUMS-USA, Minnesota Population Center, University of Minnesota
(www.ipums.org).
16 In particular, 19.2% of all of the individuals older than 25 years of age are the ones who are older than
65 in the 2000 U.S. data.
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attainment levels.17 Next, I find the distribution of males by education and the distribution
of females by education independent of marital status (Ω(z) and Ψ(z)). Using the following
accounting identities, I construct the distribution of gender-i single households by education.
Sm(z) = Ω(z)−
∑
z˜
M(z˜, z)
Sf (z) = Ψ(z)−
∑
z˜
M(z, z˜)
Labor market productivity levels are constructed using 2000 Census data. I consider
the individuals who are older than 25 and younger than 64.18 I divide the sample into
subgroups by age, gender and skill type of individuals. First, I find average weekly wages
by dividing total annual wage and salary income to total weeks worked for each subgroup.
Then, I normalize them with the mean weekly wage for the entire sample to find the relative
market productivity levels. Table 2 reports these productivity values.
Two features of this table are worth noting. First, as documented in Olivetti (2006),
age-earning profiles for females are much flatter than the ones for males. Second, as Eckstein
and Nagypa´l (2004) document, there are significant differences between earnings of people
with post-college education and college education.
Production Technology
There are 2 parameters to be determined on the production side of the model. I set
the capital share α to be 0.343 and the depreciation rate δ to be 0.432 (annualized value
is 0.055). These values are consistent with a notion of capital that includes fixed private
capital, land, inventories, and consumer durables. Altogether, this implies an annual capital
to output ratio of about 2.93.19
Social Security System
17 The level of marital sorting by education has been quite high and constant from 1940 until 1980s, but
has increased since then. See Mare and Schwartz (2005) for changes in assortative mating by education from
1940 to 2003.
18 I exclude those who are not full-time workers, or are self-employed, or are unpaid workers, or earn less
than half of the minimum wage per hour. These restrictions are in line with the ones in Katz and Murphy
(1992).
19 See Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura (2012) for details.
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As described in Equation 4, monthly benefit entitlement in the law is calculated with a
progressive formula. As the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) of a retiree increases,
the marginal benefit entitlement decreases. In 2000, first $531 of AIME is multiplied with
0.90. If applicable, next $2671 of AIME is multiplied with 0.32. Finally, the part of AIME
that exceeds $3202 is multiplied with 0.15. Accordingly, I set ξ1 = 0.90, ξ2 = 0.32, and
ξ3 = 0.15 (see Equation 4). Next, I normalize the bend points (which are monthly levels)
with one twelfth of mean household income of U.S. in 2000.20 For benchmark calculations,
I multiply these normalized numbers with the mean household income in the benchmark
model to determine the bend points κ1 and κ2. The values of these parameters are also
reported in Table 4.
Maximum taxable labor earnings for social security purposes in 2000 is $76,200 (annual).
In line with the previous calibration strategy, I normalize this cap with mean household
income for 2000. Again, I multiply this normalized number with the mean household
income that comes out of the model in order to parameterize Emax. Finally, the social
security tax rate, τ p = 0.096, is the one that balances the social security budget.
Income Tax and Capital Income Tax
I borrow the income tax functions from Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura (2014). The
effective income tax function for married households is given as
TM(income) = [0.085 + 0.058 log(I˜)]income,
and the one for single households is given as
T S(income) = [0.105 + 0.034 log(I˜)]income
where I˜ is household income normalized by mean household income of US.
Finally, I estimate the capital income tax rate to proxy the corporate income tax pay-
ments. Between 1987 and 2000, corporate income tax revenue was approximately 1.92
percent of GDP. Given the assumptions on the production technology, a 9.7 percent capital
income tax rate replicates this share.
Preference Parameters
20 Mean household income in 2000 is $57,135 (from Census).
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There are three preference parameters to be set. These are θ, γ and β. The choice of
Frisch elasticity of labor supply, γ, is based on available estimates. For married women,
Blundell & MaCurdy (1999) reports a range of estimates from 0.5 to 1, for males, MaCurdy
(1981) finds a range from 0.10 to 0.40 and Altonji (1986) finds a range from 0 to 0.35. I
assume that γ = 0.4.
Given the values of other parameters, the choice of labor parameter, θ, targets the hours
worked per worker in the 2000 U.S. Census data. A worker on average spends about 40.1%
of his/her available time for labor.21 Finally, the discount factor β results in a steady-state
capital to output ratio that is consistent with the data (see Table 4).
I assume that the utility cost of joint work, q, is distributed according to (flexible) gamma
distribution with parameters λz and µz. The pdf of the gamma distribution is given as
qµz−1
e−
q
λz
Γ(µz)λ
µz
z
where z is the type of the husband, and Γ() is the Gamma function.
Using Census data, I calculate the employment-population ratio of married females be-
tween ages 25 and 54 for each of the educational categories defined earlier.22 Table 3 shows
the participation rates of married females by types of households for 2000 U.S. economy.
The aggregate labor force participation is 69.3%. The choice of λz and µz reproduces the
participation rates of women who are married to type−z men as close as possible. For
instance, the benchmark values of λ and µ for high school graduate men imply participation
rates that are consistent with the ones reported in the second row of Table 3. This calibra-
tion strategy allows me to exploit the information contained in the differences in the labor
force participation of married females as their own wage differ by education.
4 Quantitative Analysis
Current paper aims to quantify the implications of eliminating above mentioned policies
on welfare of households and some aggregate variables. For this purpose, I evaluate four
21 I consider people who are between 25 and 54. On average a person works about 2005 hours annually.
I assume that 5000 hours is the total amount of time available for work per year.
22 I exclude all individuals who are in the armed forces from my sample.
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hypothetical changes to US Social Security system using the parameterized model described
above. In all of the hypothetical environments the pay-as-you-go structure is kept in place.
First, I eliminate the spousal and survivor’s benefits, the progressive calculation of benefits,
and the cap on social security taxable earnings all at once. Then, I eliminate each of these
policies one by one to see where the overall effects are coming from. All of these exercises
are revenue neutral in terms of income tax collections. This is achieved by an additional
linear income tax if needed. Moreover, in all of these hypothetical economies budgets of
social security systems are balanced. The analyses made below make comparisons between
steady states.
First exercise eliminates the spousal and survivor’s benefits, the progressive calculation
of benefits, and the cap on earnings simultaneously. The social security tax rate is kept
unchanged (τ p = 0.096). The function that is used to calculate benefit entitlement (Equation
4) is replaced with
B(e¯i) = 0.4389e¯i.
Hence, the progressive calculation of benefits is replaced with a linear benefit function. Note
that the value of the slope of the new benefit function balances the social security budget.
Moreover, the social security tax function, T p() (Equation 3) is replaced with
T p() = τ pei(z, j)liw.
Hence, cap on social security taxable earnings is eliminated. Finally, the spousal and
survivor’s benefits are eliminated. Equations 6 and 7 are replaced with
H(e¯f , e¯m) = B(e¯m) +B(e¯f )
and
D(e¯f , e¯m) = B(e¯j) (10)
for a person with gender j ∈ {m, f}. Such a change implies that every retiree collects his/her
entitlement as the retirement benefit.
Implications of these changes on aggregate variables are reported in Table 5 on column
titled ‘All’. The biggest change is on labor force participation rate of married females; it goes
up by 5.5%. Output increases by 1.2%, while capital and labor increase by 2.1% and 0.7%,
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respectively. Changes along intensive margin of labor supply are very small. Moreover, wage
rate per efficiency unit of labor changes very slightly.
How does this policy reform affect different households? Table 6 answers this question.
Panel A of this table shows how the retirement benefit collections of different married house-
holds change after the policy reform. Households composed of spouses with the lowest skill
types experience the biggest decline in the benefit collections. (<hs,<hs) households expe-
rience a 22.4% decline in retirement benefits. On the other hand, (col+,col+) households
experience a 23.2% increase in retirement benefits. The change in benefits gets larger as the
type of either spouse increases. Hence, eliminating these policies eliminates a redistribution
from married households with relatively high type spouses to the ones with low type spouses.
Households respond to the policy reform by changing their behavior. As Panel B of the
same table shows, labor force participation increases substantially for many types of married
households. The changes range from 2% to 10.7%. Larger response comes from married
households with relatively lower type females.
The consequences of the reform on welfare of different households are shown in Panel C
of Table 6. Among married households, the ones with relatively low type females experience
welfare losses, whereas the ones with relatively high type females experience welfare gains.
The policy change hurts (col+,<hs) households the most. Their welfare on average decreases
by about 1.1%. On the other hand, (col+,col+) married households experience a welfare
gain of 1.9%. Note that more of the losing married households are single-earners, whereas
more of the winning ones are two-earners (see Table 3).
Most types of single households experience welfare gains. Single males with a (col+)
type gain as much as 2.7%, whereas (<hs) females incur a 1.2% welfare loss. Gains in welfare
increase as the type of a single household increases. At the aggregate level welfare increases
by 0.4% (Table 7).
The main findings of this exercise can be summarized as follows. Eliminating the spousal
and survivor’s benefits, the progressive calculation of benefit, and the earnings cap have
substantial effects on female labor force participation, whereas the effects on the hours of
workers are small. Majority of households experience gains in welfare, while aggregate welfare
goes up. More of the married households composed of low type females and high type males,
i.e, single-earners, incur substantial welfare losses. Contrary happens for households with
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females of high types, the ones who are more likely to be two-earners. Next, these policies
are eliminated one by one to see where the overall effects are coming from.
Eliminating the Spousal and Survivor’s Benefit
First, the spousal and survivor’s benefits are eliminated, while keeping the progressive
calculation, and the cap on earnings untouched. Each individual receives his/her entitlement
as the retirement benefit. Benefits of all retirees are scaled up by 8.9% to achieve a balance
in the budget of social security system. The social security rate is kept at the benchmark
value.
As discussed earlier, eliminating the spousal and survivor’s benefits affects mostly single-
earner households. From the data we know that female labor force participation declines as
the type of the female decreases (Table 3). Hence, more of these households collect spousal
and survivor’s benefits. In addition, the amount of this provision increases with the type
of the male. As a result, married households with low type females and high type males
experience the largest losses in retirement benefit collections. Panel A of Table 8 shows
that (col+,<hs) married households experience a 25.1% decline in retirement benefits. As
a result, females of such households respond by entering to the labor force. For these
households, the participation rate of females increases by 11.1%, while at the aggregate level
it goes up by 4.7% (Table 5, column ‘Spousal and Survivor’s Benefit’). In addition, the
participation rate increases by more than 5% for many types of married households. Panel
C reports the steady-state welfare implications of this exercise. Majority of households gain
from the elimination of the provisions, while some married households incur welfare losses due
to the loss of the spousal and survivor’s benefits. On the other hand, since the equilibrium
benefit payments are larger, there are positive welfare effects on the households who do not
collect the provisions in the benchmark economy. These are either single households, or
two-earner married households with relatively high type females. Welfare gains are as large
as 1.3%, and welfare losses are as large as 1.3%. Due to the general equilibrium effect on
retirement incomes, the singles experience welfare gains ranging between 0.8-1%. At the
aggregate level welfare of households increases by about 0.7%. Note that this amount is
larger than the case where all policies are eliminated (see Table 7).
Table 5 shows the changes in aggregate variables with this exercise. Mainly because of a
4.7% rise in participation of married females, aggregate labor increases by 0.8%. The loss of
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the spousal and survivor’s benefits leads many married households to increase their savings.
As a result, aggregate capital increases by 1.8%. Hence, aggregate output increases by about
1.1%. Changes in hours of workers are very small.
These findings suggest that the spousal and survivor’s benefits discourage a large num-
ber of married females from labor force participation. Moreover, these provisions have a
significant redistributive role together with substantial welfare implications. The redistri-
bution is from most two-earner households (the ones with high type females) and singles to
single-earner married households and to few two-earner households.23 Elimination of these
provisions results in welfare gains for the majority of households.
Eliminating the Progressive Calculation of Benefits
Next exercise eliminates the progressive calculation of benefits, while keeping the spousal
and survivor’s benefits and the cap on earnings intact. Equation 4 is replaced with
B(e¯i) = 0.3784e¯i.
The social security tax rate in the benchmark economy is unchanged, and the slope of
the new benefit function balances the social security budget. Figure 1 illustrates the two
benefit functions. All else equal, with the new benefit function, the retirees with relatively
low amount of past mean earnings get lower income, whereas the ones with relatively high
past mean earnings get higher income. Such a change eliminates a redistribution from high
earners to low earners.
Panel A in Table 9 shows the percentage change in aggregate benefit collections of married
households by skill types. The pattern one gets out of this table is that married households
with high skilled males get significantly higher retirement incomes, whereas the ones with
low type males and low type females get significantly lower retirement incomes. The latter
observation is not surprising since this exercise eliminates a progressive feature of social
security. For households with high skilled husbands and low skilled wives, the big rise
in retirement income might look puzzling. This follows from the fact that most of these
households collect the spousal and survivor’s benefits. The benefit collection of the entire
23 A two-earner household can be elibigle for spousal benefit as long as benefit entitlement of the secondary
earner is less than fifty percent of the entitlement of the primary earner. Moreover, the survivor of the
household can be eligible for the suvivor’s benefit as long as the secendary earner’s entitlement is less than
the entitlement of the primary earner.
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household increases at the rate of the husband’s benefit entitlement (which gets even larger
due to the elimination of the progressivity).
A further observation is that the elimination of the progressive calculation increases
the gap between the wives’ and husbands’ benefit entitlements for households where the
husbands are the higher earners. As a result, more females are discouraged from labor force
participation as the spousal and survivor’s benefits become more appealing. Panel B of
Table 9 reports the resulting changes in the participation rates of married women. The
participation rates of females decline for many households. However, the effects are not as
significant as the case when the spousal and survivor’s benefits are eliminated.
Panel C of this table reports the steady state welfare consequences of this exercise. For
most households skill type of the husband determines whether a married household gains or
loses from the change. Welfare gains of marred households with highest type males range
between 1.4-2.1%, whereas for households with low type spouses, (<hs,<hs), welfare losses
are as large as 1.7%. Single women with low skills experience a 2.3% decline in welfare,
whereas high skilled single men experience a 1.4% improvement in their welfare. At the
aggregate level welfare of households decreases by 0.3% (Table 7).
Column ‘Progressive Calculation’ in Table 5 shows the effects of this exercise on aggregate
variables. The effects are relatively smaller. Due to combination of a small positive effect
on hours of workers, and a small negative effect on participation of females, aggregate labor
does not change. Since relatively low earning households experience declines in retirement
incomes, they increase their savings. As a result aggregate capital increases by 0.6% and
this leads to a 0.2% rise in total output.
The findings from this exercise can be summarized as follows. A redistribution from
relatively high earning households to low earning households is eliminated with the elimi-
nation of the progressive calculation of benefits. Even though aggregate variables do not
change much, some households are affected significantly from the elimination of this policy.
As discussed above, welfare implications of this exercise are severe for some households.
Eliminating the Cap on Social Security Taxable Earnings
Final exercise eliminates the cap on social security taxable earnings, while the other
policies are kept intact. The social security tax rate is the one in the benchmark economy.
In order to balance the budget, the benefit entitlements of each agent (given with Equation
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4) are scaled down by 0.8%. In contrast to the benchmark economy, the workers who earn
in excess of the cap level of earnings now face a higher marginal tax rate, however, in return
get a higher retirement benefit. Latter happens because past mean earnings are no longer
bounded by the earnings cap, hence, there is no longer a cap on benefit entitlements.
Panel A in Table 10 shows how the hours of workers compare to their counterparts in
the benchmark economy.24 As expected, (col+) married men who earn above the earnings
cap lower their hours significantly due to a higher marginal tax rate. On average, (col+)
married men decrease their hours by about 2.6%. Moreover, women who are married to
(col+) men increase their hours by about 0.8%. This outcome is a result of within household
reallocation of hours with response to a higher marginal tax rate faced by the high earner.
Single (col+) males also decrease their labor hours (1.4%). Welfare implications, which are
relatively small, are shown in Panel B of Table 10. Adverse welfare effects of higher taxes
for high earners are dampened by the fact that these agents are receiving higher benefits.
Aggregate welfare increases by 0.1%, while a majority of households gain from this change
(Table 7).
Table 5 shows how aggregate variables respond to this policy exercise. The changes
are not large. Since an elimination of the cap on earnings increases benefits collected by
high type individuals, aggregate capital decreases by 1.1% as the savings of such households
decline. There is a small decline in aggregate labor (0.3%), while aggregate output declines
by 0.5% percent.
Discussion
From these exercises the following findings emerge. Eliminating the spousal and sur-
vivor’s benefits, the progressive calculation of benefits, the cap on earnings all at once leads
to a substantial rise in labor force participation of married females, and substantial welfare
gains for majority of households. Welfare of married households composed of relatively
low type females and high type males, i.e, the ones who are mostly single-earners, decrease.
On the other hand, welfare of married households with relatively high type females, i.e, the
ones who are mostly two-earners, increase. Among single individuals, welfare of relatively
high type individuals increase while welfare of lowest type females decrease. In addition,
24 Since the effects along the intensive margin are much more significant, I do not report how the partici-
pation of females change.
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a significant redistribution from married households with relatively high type spouses and
high type single households to married households with low type spouses and low type single
households is eliminated.
First, I find that the rise in female labor force participation is mainly due to the elim-
ination of the spousal and survivor’s benefits. This provision discourages many married
females from work by increasing value of non-participation.
Second, the gains in aggregate welfare are largely due to the elimination of the spousal
and survivor’s benefits. As Table 7 shows, largest gains in aggregate welfare are achieved
when only this provision is eliminated. Elimination of the progressive calculation contributes
negatively to the aggregate welfare, while elimination of the earnings cap slightly increases
aggregate welfare.
Third, elimination of the spousal and survivor’s benefits is the reason why single-earner
married households, the ones with high skilled males and low skilled females, experience the
larger losses in welfare. Married households with two-earners, the ones with high skilled
members, experience large welfare gains because of the elimination of both the progressive
calculation, and the spousal and survivor’s benefits. Elimination of the latter policy benefits
these households due to a general equilibrium effect on retirement benefits. On the other
hand, elimination of the cap on earnings increases taxes of high earning individuals. As a
result, eliminating this policy has a small negative effect on welfare of married households
with highest type males.
Finally, for relatively high type single households welfare gains are mainly due to the
elimination of the spousal and survivor’s benefits, and the progressive calculation. While
elimination of the former makes all single households better off due to general equilibrium
effects, elimination of the latter favors high type single individuals by directly increasing
their retirement benefits. On the other hand, welfare losses of lowest type single females due
to the elimination of the progressive calculation outweighs the gains from elimination of the
spousal and survivor’s benefits.
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5 Conclusions
Quantitative consequences of eliminating the pay-as-you-go system in US has been explored
extensively in the literature. This is the first that paper studies the quantitative implica-
tions of eliminating the (intragenerational) redistributive policies of social security without
eliminating the pay-as-you-go feature of the system using a general equilibrium life-cycle
model. The findings of the paper have crucial policy implications. Contrary to common
perception, the redistribution currently being done by the system is mostly favoring ”tra-
ditional” single-earner American households. This redistribution is significantly hurting
many single households and two-earner married households with highly productive spouses.
Moreover, the spousal and survivor’s benefits discourage labor force participation for many
married females. Eliminating these policies increases aggregate welfare, while a majority of
households experience positive welfare gains.
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Table 1: Distribution of Households by Education, Conditional on Marital Status and Gender
Married Households
Female
Male <hs hs sc col col+ Total
<hs 6.93 4.26 2.33 0.39 0.17 14.09
hs 3.27 13.49 7.32 1.82 0.65 26.54
sc 1.8 7.47 13.61 4.3 1.52 28.71
col 0.39 2.35 5.73 7.52 2.56 18.55
col+ 0.17 0.87 2.57 4.33 4.17 12.11
Total 12.56 28.44 31.56 18.36 9.07 100
Single Households
Male Female
<hs 15.24 16.60
hs 26.69 26.48
sc 29.52 31.64
col 18.70 15.44
col+ 9.84 9.88
Total 100 100
Note: For married households, entries show the fraction of households with corresponding levels of
educational attainments of spouses. For single households, entries show the fraction of individuals
with corresponding educational levels.
Table 2: Labor Market Productivity Levels, by Type, Age, and Gender
Male
Age <hs hs sc col col+
25-34 0.536 0.754 0.867 1.182 1.509
35-44 0.635 0.896 1.097 1.550 1.988
45-54 0.666 0.955 1.174 1.646 2.061
55-64 0.729 0.958 1.209 1.705 2.294
Female
<hs hs sc col col+
0.449 0.551 0.652 0.928 1.220
0.419 0.621 0.774 1.051 1.438
0.449 0.642 0.788 1.066 1.372
0.529 0.620 0.815 1.140 1.364
Note: Entries show the productivity levels of males and females by age and education calculated using
2000 Census data. The values are constructed using weekly wages for each type (see text for details).
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Table 3: Labor Force Participation of Married Women, 25-54 (%)
Female
Male <hs hs sc col col+
<hs 41.2 62 71.5 77.4 69.2
hs 49.6 67.4 77.2 83.7 85.5
sc 50.1 67.9 74.8 82.9 88.4
col 49.1 63.6 68.7 73.2 83.2
col+ 43.6 57.3 62.1 63.5 78.7
Note: Each entry shows the labor force participation (%) of
married females ages 25-54, calculated from 2000 Census data.
Table 4: Parameter Values
γ 0.4
β 0.835
θ 25.5
α 0.343
δ 0.432
φ 0.74
κ1 0.112 of mean income
κ2 0.673 of mean income
Emax 1.33 of mean income
τ k 0.097
n 0.105
ρf4 0.818
ρf5 0.592
ρf6 0.206
ρm4 0.728
ρm5 0.456
ρm6 0.122
τ p 0.096
ξ1 0.90
ξ2 0.32
ξ3 0.15
Note: Entries show the values of the parameters used for the
benchmark economy.
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Table 5: Eliminating Redistributive Policies of Social Security
Spousal & Survivor’s Progressive Earnings
All Benefit Calculation Cap
Hours/Worker (Male) -0.2 -0.2 0.2 -0.2
Hours/Worker (Female) -0.2 -0.3 0.3 0.0
LFP of married women 5.5 4.7 -0.7 -0.1
Output 1.2 1.1 0.2 -0.5
Capital 2.1 1.8 0.6 -1.1
Labor 0.7 0.8 0.0 -0.3
Wage 0.5 0.4 0.2 -0.3
Note:Entries show the effects of changing the policies of U.S. Social Security System on selected variables
across steady states (%). The entries under the column titled ‘All’ shows the effects of removing the spousal
and survivor’s benefits, the progressive calculation of benefits, and the earnings cap simultaneously. Similarly,
the column titled ‘Spousal & Survivor’s Benefit’ shows the effects when only the spousal and survivor’s
benefits are eliminated. The column titled ‘Progressive Calculation’ shows the effects of eliminating
the progressive calculation of benefits. The column titled ‘Earnings Cap’ shows the effects of eliminating the
earnings cap on social security taxable earnings (see the text for details).
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Table 6: Eliminating All - Spousal and Survivor’s Benefit, Progressive Calculation, and
Earnings Cap
Panel A
% Change in Benefits, Married
Female
Male <hs hs sc col col+
<hs -22.4 -21.1 -10.7 -4.3 4.9
hs -22.9 -16.9 -9.9 0.0 8.6
sc -19.0 -13.7 -9.5 2.1 11.5
col -10.0 -5.1 -0.8 6.1 14.3
col+ 2.8 6.0 10.5 17.0 23.2
Panel B
% Change in LFP, Married
Female
Male <hs hs sc col col+
<hs 7.1 9.5 4.9 2.5 3.2
hs 10.7 7.8 6.7 2.4 2.1
sc 7.0 5.9 5.2 3.0 2.0
col 2.2 3.7 3.5 2.5 2.1
col+ 8.1 9.2 8.9 6.0 4.4
Panel C
% Change in Welfare
Married
Female
Male <hs hs sc col col+
<hs -0.6 0.1 0.8 0.8 1.4
hs -0.6 0.1 0.9 1.0 1.5
sc -0.9 -0.2 0.3 1.2 1.6
col -0.9 -0.3 0.2 0.9 1.5
col+ -1.1 -0.5 0.2 1.2 1.9
Single
Male Female
<hs -0.2 -1.2
hs 0.7 -0.2
sc 0.9 0.2
col 2.0 0.9
col+ 2.7 1.6
Note: Entries show the percentage change in the certain variables across steady states
when the spousal and survivor’s benefits, the progressive calculation of benefits, and the earnings
cap are eliminated at once. Panel A shows the changes in aggregate benefit collections
by types of married households, Panel B shows the changes in married female labor
force participation by types of married households, and Panel C shows the percentage
change in welfare by types of married and single households.
.
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Table 7: Aggregate Welfare
Spousal&Survivor’s Progressive Earnings
All Benefits Calculation Cap
Change in Welfare (%) 0.4 0.7 -0.3 0.1
Note:Entries show the effects of changing the policies of U.S. Social Security System on
aggregate welfare across steady states (%). The entries under the column titled ‘All’ shows
the effects of removing the spousal and survivor’s benefits, the progressive calculation of benefits,
and the earnings cap simultaneously. Similarly,the column titled ‘Spousal & Survivor’s Benefit’
shows the effects when only the spousal and survivor’s benefits are eliminated. The column titled
‘Progressive Calculation’ shows the effects of eliminating progressive calculation of benefits.
The column titled ‘Earnings Cap’ shows the effects of eliminating the earnings cap on social
security taxable earnings (see the text for details).
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Table 8: Eliminating the Spousal and Survivor’s Benefist
Panel A
% Change in Benefits, Married
Female
Male <hs hs sc col col+
<hs -1.6 1.2 6.5 5.4 3.9
hs -9.6 -4.2 0.4 7.5 6.7
sc -14.1 -7.6 -3.7 6.5 7.2
col -22.7 -17.0 -13.5 -5.8 -0.8
col+ -25.1 -21.0 -16.7 -7.8 -1.3
Panel B
% Change in LFP, Married
Female
Male <hs hs sc col col+
<hs 7.8 6.0 1.8 -0.4 -0.3
hs 9.6 6.8 4.6 1.4 -0.2
sc 8.3 6.1 4.6 2.6 0.6
col 3.5 4.3 3.6 2.5 1.8
col+ 11.1 9.2 8.0 5.0 3.0
Panel C
% Change in Welfare
Married
Female
Male <hs hs sc col col+
<hs 1.3 1.2 1.2 0.6 0.4
hs 0.6 1.0 1.2 1.1 0.6
sc -0.1 0.4 0.8 1.3 1.0
col -1.4 -0.8 -0.5 0.2 0.6
col+ -1.3 -0.8 -0.4 0.3 0.7
Singles
Female Male
<hs 0.9 1.0
hs 0.9 0.9
sc 0.9 0.9
col 0.8 0.9
col+ 0.8 0.8
Note: Entries show the percentage change in the certain variables across steady states
when only the spousal and survivor’s benefits are eliminated. Panel A shows the changes in
aggregate benefit collections by types of married households, Panel B shows the
changes in married female labor force participation by types of married households,
and Panel C shows the percentage change in welfare by types of married and
single households.
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Table 9: Eliminating the Progressive Calculation
Panel A
% Change in Benefits, Married
Female
Male <hs hs sc col col+
<hs -19.3 -22.1 -17.8 -10.2 5.3
hs -9.6 -10.7 -12.3 -10.0 1.7
sc 2.3 -1.5 -4.7 -6.4 1.5
col 23.5 24.2 20.7 13.8 13.2
col+ 33.8 33.8 33.8 29.4 26.8
Panel B
% Change in LFP, Married
Female
Male <hs hs sc col col+
<hs -0.4 1.8 2.4 2.8 4.9
hs -1.1 -1.2 -0.4 0.8 2.1
sc -0.4 -1.7 -1.5 -0.3 1.3
col -0.9 -0.9 -1.1 -1.1 -0.4
col+ -0.9 -0.8 -0.8 -1.7 -1.0
Panel C
% Change in Welfare
Married
Female
Male <hs hs sc col col+
<hs -1.7 -1.2 -0.8 0.0 1.3
hs -0.8 -0.9 -0.9 -0.5 0.5
sc 0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.5 0.3
col 1.6 1.5 1.2 0.8 0.7
col+ 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.6 1.4
Single
Male Female
<hs -1.3 -2.3
hs -0.7 -1.4
sc -0.4 -1.0
col 0.8 -0.4
col+ 1.4 0.3
Note: Entries show the percentage change in the certain variables across steady states
when only the progressive calculation of benefits are eliminated. Panel A shows the changes in
aggregate benefit collections by types of married households, Panel B shows the
changes in married female labor force participation by types of married households,
and Panel C shows the percentage change in welfare by types of married and single
households.
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Table 10: Eliminating the Earnings Cap
Panel A
% Change in Hours/Worker
Married Single
Male Female Male Female
<hs 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0
hs 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.4
sc 0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.0
col 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.0
col+ -2.6 0.8 -1.4 0.2
Panel B
% Change In Welfare
Married
Female
Male <hs hs sc col col+
<hs 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
hs 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
sc 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1
col 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
col+ -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1
Single
Male Female
<hs 0.0 0.0
hs 0.3 0.0
sc 0.0 0.1
col 0.1 0.1
col+ -0.1 0.0
Note: Entries show the percentage change in the certain variables across steady states
when only the earnings cap is eliminated. Panel A shows the changes in hours per worker
by types of married and single individuals, and Panel B shows the percentage change
in welfare by types of married and single households.
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